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At least, this is true in the usual, rccognizably pathological cases of self-
hatred.
To calf such a fcatlre of charactcr a ntordl flaw is not yet to call it blame-
worthy. The proPer form of rcsponsc may bc something in quitc a-differcnt
register from blame or rcproach. llere wc are working with a broad concep_
ti;n of thc moral on which traits arc ethically evaluable insofar as they make
a percon well or ill-suited for (pafiicular) spheres of interpersonal intetaction
(Abrarnson 2008; Abramson & Leite 201l.)
It Better to Love Better Things?
Aaron Smuts
1 Introduction
Is it better to love better things? This question is ambiguous in multiple
ways. There are at least three variables: (a) What kind ot betur do we
have in mind? Prudential, moral, aesthetic, or some other kind of bette.,
such as more meaningful? (b) What do we mean by love? Do we simply
mean'l iking,'or are we asking about something more robnst, such as
care or romantic love? (c) What kinds of tltirrgs are we talking about?
Ideals, artifacts, places, pets, or people?
From these three variables and the limited lists of suggested options
we can generate the following equation: 4 kinds of better x 3 kinds of
love x 5 kinds of obiects = 60 different questions. And we should prob-
ably consider the second 'better'as a fourth variable, making matters
more complex. Perhaps the answers are different for every question. It
seems clearly better to care about ideals in proportion to their impor-
tance. But when it comes to people/ the situation is not so straightfor-
ward. For example, it is far from clear that parents should love their
children in proportion to their rnerits.
It's not possible to address all these different questions here. To keep
the scope manageable, we need to reform the general question into
somethinS more specific. I will make two of the variables concrcte, the
kind of love and the kind of obiect. Here I intend to answer the question
'ls it better to love (in a robust sense that I will explain) better people?'I
wil l try to get clear about the kind of better at issue as we proceed.
Truth be told, I won't be offering a fully satisfactory answer to the
question. I wil l try to get a l itt le clearer about the ways it might be
better to love better people. And I wil l attempt to show how this.claim
is compatible with the 'Do-reasons' view of love - the view that l!,ve
5. ln Jamie's case, there is in fact a 
'thcre tllcrc' - there ale proiects, interests,
desircs that arc Jamic's own - but hcr rcfusal to punue thcm, out of disl ikc
for herself, gives thc appcarancc to anyone trying to love her that this i'5 not
the casc. This distinguishcs Jamic's case from, for instance, cases in which the
beloved is attempting to livc vicariously through the lovet's own intercsts,
Droiects, and desires.
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ca l rno t  l ) c  i us l i l i cd .  I n  sho r t ,  t l l e  r easo l l s  i l  i s  l ) c t l e r  t o  l ovc  be t t e r  peo l ) l c
i l r c  no t  l l l c  k i r ) ds  o f  r casons  l ha l  ca t l  i ( l s l i l y  l ovc .
2 'l'hc naturc of love
I  i n l ( ' l r ( 1  l { )  r t ' s l r i c t  t he  d i scuss io l l  l o  l ovc  o f  l ) f r so l l s ,  b t l l  t l l i s  i s  so l r l c -
w l ra l  l ) r o l ) l c l  t i c .  l fwc igno rc i r l l x ) r t a l l t i t l s l a t l c cso l l ove ,wew i l l  l i ke l y
cult ivi l tc a dclornted l l reory rcared ot l  at l  i l l ] l )alal lced diet of exalnples
- f l r i s  i s  l ) r cc i sc l v  w l l a t  we  f i t l d  i t l  l l l c  l i t c ra t l l r c .  Ma t t y  P l t i l osop l t c r s  a re
corrrf trrtablc dcnying t l lat wc catl  lovc al l i t l lals. I l t l t  t l l is scelns l)rel)os-
l c ro r r s  l o  a l l  l )U t  t l l o se  she l l e r i t lS  so lnc  l ) c l  l l l co r ) ' o l  l ove -  Peop le  ca rc
i o r  I  l r c i r  I ) c l s ,  s l ) e r1d  l ) t t ge  an lo ( t l t l s  o I  l ] l ( ) l l ( ' y  ( n l  t l l c t r l ,  a l l d  g r i cve  w l l e l l
t l r c y  d i c . l  ' l i )  ( l cny  t ha t  someo t te  g r i cv i t t g  f o r  ( l l c i r  dead  ca t  l oves  t l l c i r
l ) c l  i s  W i l ( l l y  cou r t c r i n t l t i t i ve  a t l d  l l o r r i l ) l y  i l l se t l s i l i v c . l
l iol  t l ]osc lr()t  l ) l i  kered bv a beni8l l tc( l  t l lcoly, i t  is easy to see t l lat l ()vt '
fol  pc'r 'sorts ancl Iot pets is of t l )e sanle gel leral ki l ld. ' fhcy pass t l le ioke tesl
f o r  syn ( ) r y l l r y . ' l l l e r c  i s  no th i l t g  f t l t t t l y  i l l ) o t l t  l l l i s  scn t c t l ce : ' l  l o vc  l ny  w i l c
an ( l  l ny  c l r i l ( l  r I ) o re  t l l an  a t t y th i t r g . '  No l  i s  l l l c r c  a l l y t l l i ng  f { l n l l y  a l x ) r r t
l l r i s  scn l cn (c :  ' l l e l o re  s l l e  had  l t c r  l i r s l  c l l i l ( 1 ,  s l l c  l ovcd  l l e r  ca t  l r l o r c  l l l a l l
i | l r v t l r i l l g . '  I l u t  t l l e re  i s  so rne t l t i t t g  I r t t t t t y  g t l i t t g  o l l  l l c r c :  'Bek ) re  I  l nc t  n l y
wile, I  lovct l  [r iccl cft ickert nrore tharr anvtl l i l tS. 'r  Tl le Iast sentel lce fai ls
thc iokc lcsl.  l l  is f l tnny. The ioke test rtveals al l  equivocatiol l  l l rat sl lows
us \orlcl lr ing irnportatrt  about love. l l lc sct l lct lcc equivocalcs ol l  
' love. '
l - l rc kin(l  ol love t l lal  ol le feels Ior oltc 's wifc is l lot at al l  l ike what ot le
r r ca r r s  u ' l r c r t  onc  savs ' l  l ove  f r i ed  c l t i c kc t l . 'W l t c t l  Pcop le  say  l l l a t  t l l c v
lovc lr ic( l  clr ickerl ,  thcy mcrely nrearl l l rat t l ley I ikc i t  a lot.  Btl t  this is r lol
wl lal l l ley nlcan wllel l  t l ley say that t l )cy lovc l l leir  cats. f lel lce, t l lc kir l( l
of l ()vc at issuc is r lot l l lefely l l le lovc () l  lx 'rs() l ls l l  is broa(ler '
l l rsl  l row to sct l l le bout]daries, t l louSll ,  is lar lr(nrl  obvious. Sol l le pcol) lc
rel l ly ( j()  secrl  lo love t l leir cars. Atl( l  l l ) is ( locs l lot appear lo be a tr lela-
l) lr()r.  ()ne srggestiott  that t l l iSht l lelP r ls ( l ist i l lAl l is l l  loving from l iki l lS 0
lol is I  l r  is: we ca| only love wltat wc l tcrccive to l lave a 8ood. Tl l is docs l lot
(()nlnl i t  rrs to slving t l lat cars l lave wellare. Most plausibl) ' ,  only sel l t iet l l
crcalurcs l()r wl lotr l  thi trgs t l lat ler l l : lve !( ' l [are i l l  a l lon_metapl]()r ical
scnsc. l lul  () l l lcr t l r i r l ls, suclt  as l) lat l ls att( l  cars, t  lol l-rncta pl lor ical ly have
,l(nxl\ .  I 'cr l)al)s l l rcse are best ( lescri l)c( l  i t r  l )cr lccl i() t l is l  tcr l l ls. l t  is tr l lc lear'
Irr nY casc, l l l  t l lat t  y suggestiorl  rcql l i res is l l l l l  l l !c lovcr see t l le beloved
as lravirrg a goori.  |  ( l i ( l  l lot say l l lat I  l rc lovcr r l l l lst  l )e l iSl l l .  l ' l l is Perccpl iorr
i s  i n r l n ) r l a l r t  l ) c caUse  i t l  o rde r  l i ) r  a l l  a l l i l t l ( l c  t o  l ) e  I ove  i t  t r us t  i l l vo l vc  a
on-scl l- i l | lc lcstcd conceri]  fbr the l)elov((1. ' l i )  l ) t l l  i l  l l lore precisely, ol lc
nrusl,  I l  lc lst i l r  parl ,  care for lhe bclove(l Iot l tcr owtt sake.r
Is It ll.ft( k, Lot\' lldto Tltitrcs? 9:l
2.1 Love the attitude and loving relationships
A frrrther poilrt of clarif icatior) is i lr order: we must l lc carclit l  lo distlt)-
$rish the attitude, or wllat we rniglrt somewhat rrislcadingly call ' love
the feeling,' frorn lovinll relationships. It seems perfectly colterent to
think that sonleone could love another from a distance, or tr)erely in
absence of a ronrartic relationship. One of t l le cold hard tacts ot l i fe
is that mttch love goes ullrequited. Hence, Iove sollgs. Givell t l)e lnere
possibil i ty of urrrequiled love, we can be certain that t l le ro|rrantic love
that a lover feels for l l is beloved is different from al)y ronlall l ic relation-
ship tl lat might exist betweerl the two. This is clear.
However, the diflcrcrtce between the attitude and the relationship is
nore diff icrrlt to see when it cornes to friendship. In English we lack a
sDecific word for the alti l  udc t l lal one has toward friends. We lalk of eros
and romar)tic love, l)ul nol friendros and friendly love. All we llave is
a  word  denot ing  thc  rc la ( ions l r ip ,  f r i cndsh i l t . I  suspec t  l l l a t  t l r i s  i s  l i ke ly
because the feelirrgs involvcd in friendslrips are Inore subdued than
tllose in eros. ReSardless, on further reflection it is clear tl lat (he love one
feels for a friend is also distinct from the relationshiD. distinct from the
friendship.s One can contil lue to care for a friend after Itavitrg nroved
far away. Although you cannot have a genuine friendship without the
atti lude, the attitude carr persist after the relationsll ip is over. lt can evcn
persist after the friend dies. Hence, the attitude and the relationship (the
friendship) are not t l lc sarne.
To put things togctlrer: Wllen I ask'ls better to love bettcr lhings?'I
want to know if i l  is better to love (to have an attitude tl lat essentially
involves a conccrn for the bcloved for her own sake direcled al) better
people.
The revised versiorr ol t l le opening question is sti l l  antbiguous. By
asking'ls it bettcr to lovc better people?'we rnigllt sirnply be looking
lbr ways in wl)ich it is better to love some people rather than otlters.
Clearly it is better for rne to love those who rnake rne l lappy. Tltat's not
at all controversial. Flence, I don't think that's all sofireoDe rnight be
after when they ask such a qucstion. Instead, they l ikely want to know if
t ltere are reasoDs irr favor of loving someone or another. Tll is coltcern is
captured by a sligllt ly revised version of the question, 'What reasoDs are
there to love better people?'
3 Evaluating attitudes
Irt the philosophical l i tcratrrre on attitudes, the iustif icalion of belief has
received far rDore attcllt ion than that of care, love, or t l le elnotions. I
r),1 Adrotr S,rtuts
w i l l  P r l r sue  t he  i ssu€  f r o r  I  l t c  l l e r spec t i ve  o f  I  l l c  l ) l l i l o so l ) l l y  o l  e l l l o t i o l l ,
! v l r i l e  pay ing  a t t en t i o l t  t o  t l l e  l ) r ob le l l r  o I  I t r ck  t l ] a l  l l a s  occ t l l ) i ed  ep i s te
rI |ologists lbr t l re past 50 years.
One of the most prol l l i l let l t  col lcerns of l) l l i l ()sol) l lcrs o[ elnotiot l  i5
w l l e th€ r  s tanda rd  e r r l o t i o t l s  ad tu i l  o f  r a t i o l l n l  i ( t s l i l i ca l i o l l .  T l l i s  i s sue  i s
o l t cn  sa id  t o  i nvo l vc  t hc  ra t i o l l a l i l y  o f  l hc  c t r r o l i ( ) r l s .  B t r t  w l l a t  PeoP lc
rnca r )  l ) y ' t hc  ra t i e l l a l i t y  o l  c t no l i o t t ' va r i cs  r i l ( l i ca l l y .  Wc  c i l l l  d i sce rn  a t
l cas t  f i ve  d i f f e re r l t  s t a l l da r ( l s  l i ) r  evn l t l n l i l l l l  l l l ( '  I ' r l i ( ' r l  r l i l \  , r l  l  r r ' " l i o r r i t l
r c sponses .  We  m iS l l l  wo l )d ( ' r  i l  r l l  ( ' r r r l r l r " r r
cv i deDcc .  A l t en ra l i v f l \ ,  t \ r '  r l r l ' - l l r l  '  "  r
cn ro t i on  i s  r r l t t .  Fo r  s ta l l da f ( l  e l l l ( ) l i ,  ' r l \ .  l l l !  '
t l l c i r  eva lua t i onS  a rc  Co r rec l .  ( ) r  t \ r '  r t r i . -  l , i  , 1  '
o fane tno t i on i s / r o l r o r t i ( r k l l l o i l so l ) i c c t - ( ) r n1  r ) l i ! l r l  , r . l .  r r  l l r '  ' t l r ) l l
was  i f f  one ' s  l onS- te r l n  l r 6 t  i t t ! r r s l .  F i t l a l l y ,  i v c  l ) l iS l r t  t r )  l ( )  u r r , l !  \ l a r rd
wllv sotneone would react t l lat way. l l  so, i l  wc ci l l l  r l l l ( lerstal ld 1^' l) \  t l ley
reacled as t lrey did, lhc erl lot iorr is i t t tLI l iSihlc. "
A l l  o f  t hese  s tanda rds  a re  i l l l e res l i r lS ,  a l l d  wc  co t l l d  cc r l a i r l l y  n ( l d  t o
t l l e  l i s l .  Bu t  I  wan t  t o  f oc t l s  o t l  i t l s t  onc  o f  t l l c  i l hovc ,  l l l a l  o l  ap lness  -
w l l e t l r e r  t he  emo t i o r l  i s  a l ) l ) r o l ) r i a te  t o  l l l e  l ca l t l r ( ' s  o l  i l s  ob iec l .  Th i s
s tanda rd  i s  mos t  i l t l po r t a t l t  i l l  t l l e  l i t e ra t t l r c  o l l  l ( ) vc .  T l l c  ques t i o l l  o f
w l )e thc r  we  can  i us t i f y  l ovc  i s  p r i l na r i l y  a  q t l es t i o t l  a l ) o ( t t  t l l c  ap l ) r o l l r i -
aleness of the att i tude to i ts ol) iect, the belove(|.  Wllel l  w€ ask wllet l ler
love can be iust i f ied, we watl l  lo kr low if  t l lcrc irc l lor lnativ€ rcasons
l l lat could make t l le lovc ol solne obiects npprol)r i i l lc al ld ol l lers i l l lp-
p rop r i a te .  As  I  r nake  c l ca r  i l )  t l l c  l l ex t  sec l i o l l ,  i t l s l i l y i l lS  l ( ) \ ' (  r t qu i r ( s
show ing  t ha t  t he  a t l i l t t de  i s  r esPo t l s i vc  t o  t l l ese  k i t l ( l s  ( ) l  r easo t l s .
3,1 Motivating reasons, normative reasoDs, and luck
l l  i s  i n r l , o r t an t  t o  n l akc  i l  ( l i s l i nc t i o l l  be l r { qe l l  l l l ( ) l i va l i r t g  a t l r l  t r . r r n ta -
t i v c  (o r  i us t i f y i ng )  r easo t l s .  l v l o t i va t i l l g  r easo l l s  n r c  l x ' s l  l l l ( J t r s l r  ' l  a \  a
sl)ecie5 of exPlanatory reasotls. I l l  tcr lns of act i()r ls, l l l () l ival l l l t  !r ' i tsot ls
explain why we act. A rnol ivat i t lS reasol l  is t l lc cf l icacior.rs l l lot ive ot aI l
acl ion. As the famil iar cottrtrootn dranla nlakcs clcar, a gt l i l ty verdict is
n ro re  l i k c l v  t o  be  sec t l r cd  i f  l l l e r c  i s  a  c l ea r  t l l ( ) l i v c  l i ) r  l l l ( ' c r i l nc .  W l l e r l
wc  t r y  t o  ncco { rn t  f o r  a  k i l l c t ' s  l l l ( ) l i ve ,  we  i r c  t r v i l lS  l o  ( l ( ' s (  r i l ) c  l l i s  r n { r f i -
va l i l l g  r easons .  Wc  a rc  l r y i ns  l o  exp la i t l ,  l l o l  i l l s l i l y  t l l (  c r i l r l c  R t r I  son rc -
t i r ncs ,  n l o t i va t i r ) g  r caso r l s  ca l l  a l so  l ) e  i us l i t v i l lS ,  r e i l s ( ) l l s .  l i ) r  i r l s l a t l ce ,  i f
solI lcone cracks a ral) ist 's ( lot l lc 14' i t l l  a Brooklvl l  ( :r t lsl lcr i l l  ordcr t() sk)p
a  v i o l en t  r ape ,  t he  v i c t i l l l ' s  s t l f f c r i l l g  I nos t  P la t l s i l ) l v  i r l s l i l i e s  t l l c  i t l t c r -
ven t i o r .  Thc  mo t i va t i l lE  a l l d  i t l s t i f y i l l s  r easo l l s  a r c  l l l c  sa l l l c ,  o r  a t  l eas t
close enough. Wherl i t  cot l lcs to actions, l lornlat ivc rcasol ls are thosc
ls ll llt'ttut tu Lov( It(trr,/ 7llill j' 95
that cour)t i11 Iavor oI a course oI actior. Sloppinll undeserved suflcring
is a good reas()n lo acl.
But it is inlportant to note that t l!e rrerc presence of normalive reasons
does rrot alwavs iusli ly an action.'I l l is is lrccause we are sornelirrcs
unaware of t l le nornrntive reasons tl ler! ' Ini!{l)t be to act. A lanatical
terrorist with a prcssure cooker bonll) lni8ht l)e standing in front of us at
a crowded evcr)1. If so, we surely have good reason to smasll t lre terrorist
in the back ol thc lrcad wil lr a brick bclorc an explosion is triggercd. It lrt
i f  wc  do  no t  k r )ow l l la t  the  person i r  l ron t  o f  us  i s  a  te r ro r is t ,  t l r i s  reaso l l
is not availall le lo us. lf, ignorant of thc fact, we nevertheless dccide
to crack tl le l)crson's skull for wearing an ugly sll irt, the unavailall le
normalivc rcasor) could not irrstifv orrr aclion. It is certainly rot okay
to sr ack sonlcone for \4'earil lg an rrgly sll irt. Tl)is reveals sornctl l inl l
important abolrl nornlative reasons: in order to iustify arl action, thc
normalive rcasons nrust feature prorninently in the set of motivatirg
rcasons tbr l lre action. lf t l le person we srnacked for wearing an ugly
sh i r t  tu rne( l  ou l  lo  be  a  te r ro r is t ,  th is  wou l ( i  be  a  happy acc idcn l .  l l l r t
the  unknown fac t  t l l a t  l l e  was  a  te r ro r is l  wou ld  no t  j t ' s t i f y  lay i rg  l r i | | l
out for l l is lack ol goocl fashion serlse. l lapl)y accidents do lrol a[rourll
to  ius t i f i ca t ions .
Tlrere is no reason to think tl lal t l le situation is any different wllerl
i t  comes to  ius t i f y ing  a t t i tudes  and o thsr  r to r ) -ac t ions .  A l though lhere
are not (straigl)tforward) motivati g rcasons for attitudes, l l lcre are
cxplanatory reasorrs. They give us tlrc ctiolol{.v of the attitude. ln order
for an attitudc to be justif ied in the scnse al issue here, thc ctiology
rnust l)rornincrtly include thc justifyinll reasons. l l  t l lere wcre nor[ra-
tivc reasons for lraving arr attitude, l:rul t lrc reasons did nol featurc in
the  exp la t ]a l io r )  o f  lhe  a t t i tude ,  t l re  p rescrce  o f  l l l e  normat ive  reasons
would Inerely l)e a happy accident. -fo put it ar)other wa-y, ar) ail i tude
is a happy acci(lc|lt in relation to sorne nonDative reason unless tlre
attitude is a response to that normalive reason. A iustif ication lor an
attitude rr|usl show ll lat t lre attitude is a response to normative reasons,
Dot mcrely tl lal sorre such reasons erisl.
4 Justifyin!{ love
Tlrere are two colrl l)ctir8 scl)ools ol l l l()ugllt on tlre issue oI wllctlrcl
love can be justif i( 'd: t l le no-reasons vicw ard l lre reasons view. 'f l le
no-reasons vicw is iust as it sounds. It lrol(ls l l lat love canrrot l)e iusli l ied
or, to put it sonlcwhat arntriguouslv, that lhere are no iustifying reasons
for love. A no-reasons view holds o|]e o[ lwo clains: (a) there arc |lo
I
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normative reasons for love, or (b) the attitude is not responsive to what-
ever putative normative reasons tl lere night be. In coDtrast, the reasons
view holds that love can be iustif ied. Justifying love requires showinS
both that there are normative reasons for love and that the attitude is
responsive to these reasons at the appropriate stage in its life cycle.
This is no place to defend the no-reasons view, but I witl sketch some
support. The no-reasons view is supported by three types of considera-
tions: love's apparent lack of reasons responsiveness, the failure of the
opposition to provide a plausible alternative, and the lack of any clear
account of how love could be justif ied in principle.
Our literary ftadition from Sappho to Shakespeare provides support
for the claim that love is not an obiective assessment of the beloved. To
take an extreme and somewhat offensive example, Lucretius sees love
as a delusion:
The black girl is brown sugar. A slob that doesn't bathe or clean / Is a
Nahtrctl leauty; Athena if her eyes are greyish-green. / A stringy been-
pole's a gazelle. A midget is a .tprite , I Cutc as 4 buxofi. She's a knockout
if she's a Siant's height. / The speech-impaired has a charming lithp; if
she can't talk at all / She's sft,'. The shary-tongued shrew is spankl, a
little lircbatt. / If she's too skin-and-bones to live, she's a slip of a girl,
if she / ls sicklt she's just delicatc, though half dead from TB. / obese,
with massive breasts? - a Noddcss of fertility! / Snub-nosed is pert, lat
l ips are pouts beSSing to be kissed - / And other delusions of this kind
are too numerous to list. (Lucretius ZOO7 , IV, p 142, ln. 1760-70)
We need not think that love essentially involves error. Lucretius goes
much too far. Nevertheless, love does not seem to follow from any obiec-
tive appraisal. Love rides over and above any assessment of the beloved
(Singer 1966). We can work at trying to love someone, but it seems to
iust happen or not. No matter how good we think that someone is,
we may or may not love them. Love, at least to some degree, iust does
seem to be a matter of chemistry. And chemistry is not responsive to
reasons.
The no-reasons view also Sains support from the failure of the compe-
tition. Any attempt to appeal to the properties of the beloved runs into
the problem of trading upi if what iustified your stafiing to love X were
X's good features, then if Y has a Sreater degree of the same features, it
seems that you should trade up. How could your continuing to love X
be iustified in the face of Y? But this is absurd. The obiects of our love
are not fungible. They are irreplaceable individuals.T Love that accepts
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substitutes is not worthy of the name. Alternative approaches appeal to
the value of the relationship rather than the properties of the beloved.
But relationship accounts do not fare much better. They also imply that
one should trade up, not when the beloved is better, but when there is
the promise of an even better relationship.
These are but the opening moves in the debate. It is out of scope to
pursue the issue further. For our purposes, the third source of support for
the no-reasons view is most important.
4.1 Love and emotion
There is excellent reason to think that love is not an emotion. At least,
it is not an emotion according to the only theory of the emotions
on which it makes sense to talk about iustif ication. This is imDor-
tant because the reasons love is not an emotion also show that love
cannot be assessed as appropriate or inappropriate. If one assumes that
emotions are irrational bodily states, it makes l itt le sense to evaluate
them in terms of appropriateness. Hun€ier can be 
€iood or bad for us,
but it can't be inappropriate. If the emotions are akin to hunget there is
no sense in trying to iustify them. The only theory of the emotions that
clearly allows for robust rational iustif ication is also one of the most
popular - the cognitive theory. But love is not an emotion according to
the cognitive theory.
According to the cognitive theort emotions are obiect-directed atti-
tudes that essentially involve evaluations.8 According to this view
emotions are not mere feelings or physiological reactions. Instead, they
require an evaluation of a situation, whether the evaluation be a iudg-
ment or a way of seeing, a construal. The obiect-directed character of
standard emotions is apparent in that it always makes sense to say of
someone'lpick your emotion] that. ' I fear that a Rhode Island driver
wil l crash into me when I'm out for run. I hope that I wil l make it home
safely. I'm angry that yet arlother driver ran a stop sign as I was running
through the intersection. Defenders of the cognitive theory typically
distinguish between ernotions and mere moods, such as being grumpy,
cheerful, or simply in a good mood. Moods do not take obiects, at least
not specific objects. One is not grumpy that such and such. Rather, one
is just grumpy. One might be grurnpt/ because of a hangover. But one is
not grumpy r|f the hangover. Nor is one grumpy that one is hung over.
Although someone might be ashamed of being once again unable to
resist the siren call of bourbon, this is not the obiect of the grumpiness.
At most, it is the mere cause. Shame is an emotion; grumpiness ii a
mood.
9lJ Adrrr J,rr l Is
' l l l c re  
a re  t l l r c c  exce l l e l l t  r easons  t o  t h i l l k  t l l i r t  i f  t l l e  cog l ) i t i ve  t l l eo ry
i s  r i g l r t  t he r l  l ove  i s  l l o l  a l l  e rno t i o r l  F i r s t ,  i l l  co l l t r as t  t o  s ta t l d i r d
cn ro t i o l r s ,  l ove  i s  l l o t  cp i sod i c  as  a re  a l l  s l a l ) da r ( l  e l no t i o l l s -  t l l l l i ke  pa ra -
d ig r ! r a t i c  e r t o t i o t l s  suc l l  as  l ea r ,  s l l a t r ] c ,  a l l d  a l l gc r ,  l ovc  does  l l o t  P rcse r l t
i t ictf  i rr  cl iscrerc episodes strre, yor.r tnay wcl l  up wllen reunitc( l  wi l l r
son)eone yol l  lovc, ot t)urst i l l lo tears r 'vht ' l t  1'ott  l lapPily discovcr that
yorrr l)cloved avertcd disaster, bt l t  t l lcse lcel ir tg are best dcscribed as
episoclc's of tr lr l i f t ,  l )appit less, arld l l re l ike, t lot love Tltet l  agair l '  perhaPs
one ( ioes sol l lel i l r les fcel lovc actl tcly. l l t l t  even wllel l  ol le isl l ' t  feel ir ls
w l ra tevc r  i t  i s  t l l l t  we  t l l i ! t k  o f  as  t l l c  f ee l i l l g  o f  l ove ,  o t re  s t i l l  l o vcs  A
l)arenl doesl l ' t  slol) lovit lS t lreir chi ld \ ' \4rel l  t l ley are driving to work'
f r us r ra l cc l  by  t r a f f i c  co t lScs t i o t r .  No . ' l l l e i r  l ove  re t r t a i ns  l l c l l ce '  r a t l l e r
t l r a r )  ep i sod i c  l ove  a l ) pea rs  t o  bc  d i sPos i t i ona l  
' r  I t  i s  wha t  A lexande r
S t rand  ca l l s  a  se r r t i t nen t  ( 1914 ) .
Second ,  a l l l l ough  i t  i s  p l aus ib l e  l ha l  we  ca l t  sone t imcs  f ce l  l ovc  a r l d
no t  j us t  t t l e  e l no t i ons  i t  g i ves  r i se  1o ,  t l l e  i n rPo r tan t  t l r i nS  t o  rea l i ze
is { l lat our errot iol l t  dc'pct ld on our col lccrt ls. l 'hey dcpellcl  ot l  wnat
we care about. [ , lnotiol]s rcqtt irc t l lat !re care about t l lat wl l icl l  was or
s ta rds  t o  be  a l f cc ted .  "
ns note(l  al)ovc, slal ldard el l lot iol ls take obiects- Tl lcy esscl l t ial ly
i nvo l vc  a t l  eva lua t i o l l  o f  a r r  ob lec l ,  o r  wha t  we  ca l l  t l l e ' f o rma l  ob iec t '
' lhc lonnal obi i- 'ct i5 t l le ol) iect ut ldcr solr le dcscriPtiot l  We attr i t)ute
sonle tealure to t l)e ol) iect, such as dal lgerousrless to a snarl i l l ! ,  do8's
l o t l g ,  s l l a rp  t ce th .  A r l  eva lua t i o l l  t l l a l  l l t e  l o l l g ,  s l l a rP  t cc t l l  a r c  da l lSc ro t t s
ci l(scs thc pl lysiological resPollscs cl laracterist ic oI fear'  TlIe eval l la-
t i on  no t  o t t l y  has  a  f o r t na l  ob iec l ,  i t  l ] as  a  f ocus  The  tee th  a re  no t  j us t
da gerous i l l  Pri l lc iPle Tht 'y are thfeatcnir lg Morc precisely'  they
{ l l r ca tenso l l l e t l l i l l S tha twcca rea l l o t r t  t r a l l r e l y ,  ou Ia r t l l s  Wewou ldn ' t
l 'ecl fear i f  t l te teeth t l l reatened t l le destr( lct iol l  ol  a chew toy l f  we cal l
love alr errtot iol l ,  we losc r l)e explat latory l)ower of t l le priori ty of cares
ovcl emotiolrs. l t  would bccotJlc hard to Inake sense ol t l le i l l terconnect-
edness oI our en]ot iol lal  l ives.
T l l e  t l l i r d  r . ' ason  t o  t h i nk  t ha t  l ove  i s  no t  an  emo t i o l l  acco rd i l l g  t o  t l ) e
col l l l i t ive t l teory is t l )e nrost import i l l ) t  for ol lr  pt lrposes tJr l l ike startdard
e rDo t i ons ,  t l l c re  i s  l l o  c l ea r  eva lua t i o l l  i t t vo l ved  t l l a t  l l e l ps  i l l d i v i dua te
lovc from othcr sl)ccies ol affect. According to lhe cogl l i t ive thcory'
s tan . l a rd  e l l l o l i o l l s  l l o t  on l y  csse l l t i a l l y  i l l vo l vc  eva lua t i ons  bu t  l l l e
eva lua t i o l t s  a r c  l l l e  p r i t l c i l ) a l  I t t eans  l r y  u ' l l i ch  wc  d i s t i l lSu i sh  en to t i ons
fronl orle anothcr. Consider feal attd attger, ioy ancl pride, el l ly and
iealousy, at ld sltatt le at ld enlbarrassulclt t :  cacl l  pair fccls sinri lar '  
There
is lrardly arry tel l i r lg thern aPart mcrely frorn the way t l ley leel Bttt  the
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kind of evaluations they involve differ. For an emotion to be atrget you
rnust judge that someone has wronged you or yours. ln contrast, for
an emotion to be that of fear, yor.r rnust iudge that sonething you care
about is in danger.
The problerr for those who claim tlrat love is an enrotion is that tf iere
is no plausible evaluation that is necessary for love.rr The only viable
candidate seems to be that the object is lovable. But this is l lopeless. lt is
circular and erlt irely uninforrnative. 
.Just what is it to judge an object to
be lovable? There are no other good candidates. For instance, to judge
that the beloved is irreplaceatrle to you is simply to recognize that you
love it. Hence, it can't be the evahlation responsible for your love.
The moral of the story is that since there is no clear candidate evalua-
tion that is necessarv for love. it is unclear how love could be assessed tbr
cvaluativc correctness. What evaluation should be checked, exactly? In
I l lc next section, I sl low how the disinterested nature of love nakes this
problem more pronounced. It has important implications for the kinds
of reasons that ottrers have appealed to.
5 Prudential, epistemic, and meaningful reasons
So far I have said a bit about the nature of love and the nature of justi-
f ication. Without assuming the no-reasons view, I wil l show that the
kinds of consideratiorrs that one finds in the l iterature are rrot the kinds
of reasons that could ever justify love. Accordingly, there is no problem
lor the no-reasons view here.
Harry Frankfurt argues that the principal reason one has to love is self-
interest. Since love is so important for l iving a good life, he argues that
l l le nost important consideration when we are thinking about what we
rlroulrl love is simply whether we can love it, not whether it is worthy.
I lrI valrrc of t l le obiect is of l i tt le interest. He asks of the Final Sohrtion:
'\\r lr it r( irsolr would he [Hitler] have, after all, to care about something
llrni nrakes no irnportant difference to hirn?'(Frankfurt 2002, p.248).
lfankfurt obviously thinks that caring (or loving) is good for us. It is
goocl for us to love. Why he thinks this is less evident. As far as I can tell,
lre thinks that loving makes our l ives fulf i l l ing. It does this by helping to
prevent apathetic suffering and boredom. This is l ikely right. It probably
is indeed good for us to love. And it is probably prudentially better to
love what is better at makinS us happy. But these kinds of considerations
are incapable of iustifying any given instance of love. In fact, they appear
to be entirely the wrong kind of reasons that one can offer in favor of
loving a particular individr.lal. At best, they can justify loving in general.
1O0 ,4dro,r.!t/ttJ
We are looking for reasons in support of particular instances ol love:
'What norrnative reasorls tniSht there be to love X?' We are not looking for
a general iustif icalion of loving. In the closely related l iterature oo whetlrer
partiality (to famil, fr iends, race, ethnicily, or nation) is ever permissible,
many are content witlt a Seneral defense ol simply being Partial lf we were
not partial to our friends and family, our lives wotrld srrf{er. The goods of
close personal relationships would be lost. Hence, it seenls partialitv is irr
general iustif ied.'2 Here we need not worry whether tl l is style ol argttment
succeeds. I merely note it to show that it simply does not address l lr( '  issue
at hand. We do not want to know wllether it is Sood lo love; we want to
know if we can iustify our love of specific individuals.
It is crucial to see that the putative pnrdential value of lovil lg (in
general) cannot provide a iustif icatioll for lovirtg sonle spccil i( l)ersorl.
The srggestion that one's love fbr X is it lstif ied because it is Sood tor otre
to love X, or because it is better for orre to love X than Y fails. It fails
because love requires non-self-interested concerl). And one catlnot, orl
pain of incoherence, love another non-self-intercsledly because doitlg
so benefits oneself. The same holds for indirect fornts of benefit, say,
through tl le value oI a relationship. Orle callnot carc lor anotller for her
sake for one's own sake. Rentenrber, for a teasott to iustify an atti lude,
the attitude must be resDonsive to tlre reasorl. If t l le reason is sclf-in-
terest. the attitude cannot be respolrsivc to tl l is reasoll and be l lotl-self-
interested.r3 Hence, self-interest canrlot it lstify any partictl lar occurrence
of love. At best it can iustify lovirlS i lr $cneral, bcil lE opeo to love, or
what we lnight call the institution of lovitrg.
Frankfurt recoSnizes i l)at there is a 'certailr incorlsistency' l lere. He
says:
The apparent contl ict between selflessness arld self-irtterest disal)pea rs
once it is understood that what serves the self-i lrterest of thc lover is,
precisely, his selflessness. The benefit of loving accrues to him only if
he is genuinely selfless. (1999, p. 174)
But this doesn't solve the problem. lt worr't just t l isappear irt a puff of
smoke after a bit of hand-wavin8. The fact t l)at t l le bcrlefit catl accrrte
only if the lover is selfless lrows that the reasolls of self-interesl cannot
iustify love. One call ' t be responsive to reasons of self-interest alld be
selfless. In fact, Frankftlrt has Siven us a perfect statement of a l lapPy
accident. Although it is not inconsistetlt to tl l ink that one could benefit
from selflessness, it is incoherent lo tl l ink that self-i l l terest could iusti ly
one's selnessness.
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Tl)e same considerations hold for the reasons of truthfulness and the
reasons of meaningfulness, reasons that Srrsarr Wolf proposes i l) response
to Frankfrrrt (Wolf 2002). One cannot love another for her own sake for
the sake of truth or for the sake of making one's l i fe more rneaningful.
That's incoherent. A defender of the no-reasons view could grant that it
is prudentially, trutl l lul ly, and meaningfully better to love better people
but sti l l  hold, without any kind of tension, that love cannot be ration-
ally iustif ied.
6 What's wrong with loving Hitler?
Although reasons of prudence, truthfulness, and meaning cannot iustify
love, there sti l l  seems to be something to the claim that it is better to
love better people. lt seems tlrat some people are indeed more lovable
than others, and that some people are iust not worthy of love. This
seems to be a silnple matter of evaluative correctness.
Wolf argues that t l)ree lactors are relevant when evaluating love: the
worth of the beloved, the Iover's affinity for the beloved, and the instru-
nrental value of t l le relationship. She develops her view with an array
of examples that concern obiects and activit ies: types of music, water-
melon-seed spitt ing, rubber-band collecti ltg, and the l ike. A similar set
of examples is featured in her work on the Ineaning of l i fe (Wolf 2002,
2010a). It is plausible to say that one is iustif ied in preferring rock music
to classical music by appeal to alf inity and instrurnental value, regard-
less of any possible differences in the wortl l of t l le two types of music.
But the tlreory sits more uncomfortably wllen it comes to people.
An athletic father of two might have a greater affinity for his sporty
child with whorn he wil l certainly l lave more fun at the park. We can
assume that the two children are of equal wortl l, but by Wolf's theory
this doesn't mean that the father should love both equally. Since he
has a Sreater affinity for the athletic son, and (let's assume) their t ime
together wil l be more instrumentally valuable, her theory implies that
he should love tlre athletic child more. That's not a nice imDlication.
Perhaps our reactiolr to this exalnple rcflects a quirk of parenlal love.
Maybe we have a deep commitment to a view of unconditional parental
love. Perhaps we tllink of it as a form of agape, the bestowal of love
regardless of the worth of the obiect. Regardless, the situation seems
differellt when it comes to romantic love. As Wolf notes, it seems that
some people are indeed rnore lovable than others and it would be better
to love them than less worthy individuals. How should we make.sense
of this?
t
lllz Aorcn Snluts
lf love essentially involves an evaluation, we could easily make sense
of this intuit ion. But there is no good candidate. As Doted earliet the
only plausible candidate is that t lre object is lovable. This is not suffi-
cient, since we might t l l ink that people are lovable yet not love them.
llut it might be necessary. If we had a better l)andle on what makes
someone obiectivelv lovable, we could evaluate love in ternrs of evalu-
ative correctness. It would be inappropriate to love tl lose who are not
lovable. The problern, once again, is that there is no content to tlre
notion of what it is to be lovable. At best, it is subjectively determined.
Sorneone is lovable if someone can love vou. But that kind of subiec-
tivity makes it inpossible to assess love. All love wotrld be appropriate.
Put aside the nature of beinS lovable. Perhaps it would be better to talk
in terms of an overall assessrnent of the person. For love to be appro-
priate, the beloved sfrould be a good persor] overall. This is a bit more
promisiog, but it is sti l l  fails. For starters, what kind of good do we have
in rnind? Will iust any do? Aesthetic? Is it appropriate to love a beautiful
l)erson who is not so virtr.rous? Or does moral worth trump all? That's
hard to believe.
Apart from these questions, the celrtral problern with any attempt to
evaluate love according to some kjnd synoptic evaluation of the beloved
is that love isn't an evaluation. Nor does it seem to essentially involve
any such evaluation. Love rides over and above our evaluations of the
beloved. We can be crit icized for falsely evaluating people, but love is
not an evaluation. Nevertheless, the relationship between love and eval-
uation is important.
Consider someone wllo falls in love with Il i t ler, who somehow faked
ll is death and managed to flee to South America:ra
Argentina, 195O: Evita nret a strange looking Inan with a German
accent at the market. Sl)e finds him oddly attractivc. As they get to
know each othet she develops a nagging suspicioll that he is Adolph
Hitler. After a few weeks, he confesses to having faked suicide and fled
to South America when the Nazi cause looked ltoDeless. Evita decides
not to turn him, as she thinks that she is fall ing in love.
Considering this case, it seems that love is indeed sor etin)es prohibited.
It certainly seems inappropriate to fall in love witlr Hitler. Remember, we
are talking about Hitler! And if i t is inappropriate, there nrust be norma-
tive reasons against loving.
This is certainly a worrisome problem for the no-reasons view. But
ttre view is not without a plausible reply. An analogy rniSht help. The
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French vitalist Herrri Bergson noted that hrrmorous arnusement requires
a'momentaryaneslhesia of the heart' (Bergsolt 1956, p. 64). Simply put,
it is hard to be amrrsed if one feels sorrv for the butt of a ioke. Sonletl l ing
similar might be said for love, It is hard to love solneone you find repuI-
sive. Hitler is repulsive, rlot iust because of t l le stupid mustache, but
because of what lre did. He's a moral rnonster. How could someone
possibly love such a nran? IJow could one spend enough time with l l i l l
for that to happen? In these obseryations, t lte no-reasons view finds a
reply: it is not lhal love of I l i t ler is inappropriate, but that not f inding
him repulsive shows a monstrous indifference to lrorrif ic evil.rs
At worse love can be indirectly, cou nterfact ua l ly inappropriate. If F,vila
had shown proPer repulsion to Hitler's crirnes, she would have likely
found it psychologically impossible to fall in love witl) Hitler. This docs
not show that Hitler is obiectively unlovable. Instead, it shows tl lat trre
typical psycholoSical effect of moral repulsion is the blocking of love.
The question this leaves us is whether it should ttock love.
What would wc say of someone who found l-l i t ler repulsive but sti l l
loved him? If it is incollerent to be botl l reDulsed and ilt love, then wc
can say that lovc is indirectly inappropriate. The person sllould have
been repulsed. Repulsion blocks love. Hence, the person shouldn't
love Hitler. At least she shouldn't have fhllerr in love with Flit ler. But
I don't see any reason to think that this combination of attitudcs in
incoherent. Unusual, ycs. Incoherent, wlly? And if i t is coherent to botlt
love someone and be repulsed by their character or actions, then tl lere
is not much to say of someone who loves l l i t ler otl ler than that she ls
very abnormal.
7 Conclusion
As l noted in the ir)troduction, I have not provided a completely satisfac-
tory answer to tl le question, ' ls it better to love bette. things?'The ques-
tion is iust too ambiguous and too diff icult to tackle in a single essay.
Even the more specific question,' ls it better to love better peopte?,' is
hard to pin down. But I have provided sornc answers.
I have argued tl lat love essentially involves carilrg for the beloved ltrr
her own sake. This is clearly not a sufficienl description of love. Mosl
plausibly, typical lorms of love also involve desires to associate witl l
t l)e beloved and for t lte desire to be reciprocated.r('These desires migll l
admit of rational assessrnent. If desires are tl le kil]d of things that can be
iustif ied, it seenrs that reasons of self-interest, for instance, corrld justify
a desire to associate witl l  t l le beloved. But I don't think that these desires
i
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cap lLr re  w l ra t  i s  a t  thc  hcar t  o l  love .  A t  l lear t  i s  sc l f less  co l l cc rn .  l lence,
I  Iocus  on  t l r i s  aspec t  o f  love .  And t l r i s  aspec t  i s  d i l fe re l r t  f ro tn  bo th  lhe
(lesire to associate witl l  t lre beloved and tl lc desire lor reciprocatioll. l t 's
d i f le ren t  in  tha t  i t  carno t  be  jus l i f ied  by  appea ls  to  va lucs  suc l )  as  se l f -
i l ] t c rcs l ,  t ru lh lu luess ,  o r  lnean ing .  Onc carno t  care  fo r  t l l e  l l c lovcd  lo r
l le r  own sa l (c  fo r  t l l c  sake o f  t l )ese  va lucs .  T l ra t ' s  inco l le rer t t .
Ncverll leless, it does sccln betlcr', in terrl ls ol aPl)ropriatcncss (or
l i t l i ngocss  or  np lDcss) ,  to  love  [ )e t te r  pq ] l ) l c .  A l l l l oug l l  love  is  l lo t  an
asscssnre l r t ,  i t  i s  l yp ica l l y  b lockec l  I ry  cer la i r  k i r lds  o f  asscss t l l cn ts  o l  t l l e
l )e loved.  Wl rc l r  wc  don ' l  unders ta r l ( j  l l ow a  I r ie r ( l  car )  love  a  bor i t tS ,
i rnnrora l ,  ug ly  loser ,  wc  arc  l )uzz le ( l  a t  l )ow l re  fa i led  to  corne  to  l l re
proper  l rcga t ivc  eva lua t ion  o f  l ) i s  be lovcd,  o r  a t  how l l le  neSat ive  va lu
a t io r t  d idn ' t  b lock  lovc .  We expec t  t l r i s  to  l lappen,  thouSl l  we k t low i t
o l feD fa  i l s .
I considerecl an espcciit l ly clear case, I lvita's lovc of f l i t ler. Llere we
want to say l l lat slle should not love Il i t ler - rtot because he docstt 't
dcserve to benefit fronl her concenr, blrl because slre slrttuld ltave l)een
rcpo lsed.  H i t le r  i s  l ) ideo t rs ly  cv i l .  I l  so tneot te  fa l l s  fo r  l J i t l c r  dcsp i te  the
fac t  tha t  l r . ' i s  I r ideous ly  ev i l ,  thcy  are  l i ke ly  ind i f le re r r t  o  h is  c r imes.
'f lrat's 
not acceptable. lD so far as r oral disgust blocks love, love ol
H i t le r  i s  i rd i rec t l y  inappropr ia te .  B l r t ,  as  la r  as  I  car )  te l l ,  lhe te  i s  t ro
reason to  th ink  t l ra t  d is l ius t  oug l r t  to  b lock  love .  I t  ius t  te r tds  to  do  so .
I  l l l i nk  t l )a t ' s  about  a l l  we ca  say .  Ar rd  i t  sccnrs  l i ke  enoug l l  to  capture
our  most  i rnpor faDt  i r ) tu i t io l lS- l7
Notes
I A silr i lrr lrglinrcrrt calr l)( 'ron in sul)poll ()l t lrc sutl)risinsly contr()\ 'ersial
c l l in r  l l ra l  , ln i l l ra l \  can  l ( )vc . ' lhcy  a l \o  g r icve l  l l cko t l  (2 (X)7) ,  pp .62  70 ,
lv l i l l i g ln  (21) l1 ) ,  pp .  124 136,  l t l ) \ ' l i rn (h  (201:J ) ,  pp .  l l  14 ,  i rnd  Sr r ru ts  ( r r ranu-
scl ipt) arSuc ir l  supl)(nt {)f  thc vicw lhirt  animals ci ln ci lrc.
2. l lc lnr (z(X)c)),  p. '+5. K() l(xlnv (2(X):J), l ) .  l l t7, n.2 t()es s() f l r  i rs to Llcny that
cl l i ldren can lovc.
:1. aircc'n ( l lx l7), pl).  2lO rnd 224 l)roushl fr icd chickcr] t() ot lr  sytr l l )osit lnl .
4 .  W( ) l l  ( 20 lOh ) ,np .  l 4 i nd lT ig r ccs .Ncwt r )nS I1 r i t l r ( l ( ) l l 9 ) , p .204pu tsc i r c i r t
lhc t()p {)f  thr c(nccpls analyt icir l ly [csrrpp()scd by thc trsc ()f ' l ()vc. '
5. l( t l i rr)orc (2(X)()),  l ) .  73 concurs.
6. lorr( 's (2{X)4), pf. : lJ: l  6 pft)vidcs a sirrr i lnr l ist.
7. ( ir i lu (200aj, 2010) ()f fcrs l l )c bcst acc()t lnt of irrcpl l(c:thi l i tV in thc l i teraturc.
8. I ' r in/ (20(),1) anLl lk)binson (2{)05) prrrvir lc i l l rpoftant, rccent cr i t ic isrns ol thc
th{rny. I lci !h (1!194) arsucs thirt  t l rc cosrr i t ivc thcorv inrplausi l ty inr l l ics
that i lnimrls and l)al) ic\ d() n()t  l rrv! tnr{)t ions. I iowlirr ld\ (2{}12), l) f .  40-70
l)r ' ()viclcs an cffcct ivc r 'cply to I)r ' igh.
9. Nailr  (201.3) d(rfer)ds a disposit i()nrl  htof,v.
Is Il ltetter to Lov? Il?ttcr ThifiSs? l1s
i0. Taylor (1975), pp.400 I notes the conncction, as do Stockcr (1996), p. 175,( lrcc ( l997), pp.214 and 227 2, a]nt l  {awls (1971), p.487. Solomon (1980),
p. 276, argucs that ernotions are persooal and involvcd cvaluations. l 'aylor
(1985), pp. 59-62, argucs that ernotions reveal what we valuc, what matters
k) us. ' l 'hcy are imporFascript ions. Roherts (19tt8), pp. 188-9, claims that
cmotions arc groundcd in concerns. Shoemakcr (2003), pp. 91-:1, argues
lhat cmotiorls are conccptual ly connectcd k) carcs. I Ielm (2009a), pp. .5-6,
notcs that emotions havc a focus, a locus of c()ncern. And Nussbaum (200:l)
argues that orot ions are evaluations of personal importance. Strangclt in
his comprehcnsivc and inf lucntial taxonomy of lhe obiects of cDrotions, De
Sousa ( l999), ch. 5 lcavcs out the object of our concern. I  Ie uscs ,focus, dif fer-
cntly, k) rcfcr to thc focus of attcntion: thc snarl ing dog's rrcnacing t(reth
I l .  ' lhis leads Shaffer ( l98:l) ,  p. 170, k) cla irn that lovc is an 'anornalous cnlot ion.,(;recn (1997), p. 214, thinks t l)at t l t is obscures thc problcm. IIe simply dcnit:J
that lovc is a cnrol ion.
12. Tl l is rrhccl has bccn invented a fcw t iDcs: Cott ingham (1986) dcfends this
l ine of argurlcnt. Witho t nrentioning Cott ingham; thc l iame stylc of arSU
mcnt is relcatcd iD Wolf (1992), who dcfcnds thc c()ntrovcrsial claim t l)at
part ial i ty sornctimcs trumps moral i ty And without mcntioning Wolf 's paper,( locking and Kennctt (2000) reach roughly thc samc conclusi()n.
13. Oldcnqrf ist ( .19n2\, p. 176, ar 'gucs that since wc cart sacri f ice in thc narnc of
l{)yalty, loyalt ies arc not sclf , inicrcsted.
14. leske (1997), p. 62, defends a no rcasons, or ' l )rute acc{}unt ' fr iendship. Shc
(p. 69) considcrs whcther one sho|ld bcfr iend I l i t lcr.  Mil l iSan (201 1), pp. 5
and 72, also discusses thc love of I  l i t ler.
15.: irnuts (2007, 2(X)q, and 2013) develops an analogous l inc of argument
conccrning moral i ty aDd amLtscment.
16 .  ' l ' homas  (1991 ) ,  ( l r een  (1997 ) ,  p .  216 ,  and ' l hy l o r  ( 1976 )  a l l  emphas i zc  t hcsc
aspccls ()f  rolnantic Iovc.
17. I  than k Arin a l isrnen ny a nd Tonv Mil l igan for ht ' lpfu I  fecdback on an carl ier
vcrsion of this chaptcr
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